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Abstract
Instead of abolishing internal border controls in 1992, the European Union (EU)
replaced them with VAT and statistical requirements that appear to be just as onerous
and costly. This paper shows that the compliance costs of the new requirements are on
average 5 percent of the value of intra-EU trade of Dutch businesses. Clearly, the costs
constitute a (differentiated) border tax that impedes intra-EU trade and violates the
Treaty of Rome. The paper analyses the magnitude and determinants of the compliance
costs, as well as their effects on intra-EU trade intensity. It is shown that even minor
additional compliance costs have a significant negative effect on intra-EU trade.
71. Introduction
In 1985, the European Commission submitted a White Paper to the Council of the
European Union (EU) with a program to achieve a Single market by 1992. The
Commission expressed the belief that the removal of internal frontiers – the clearest
manifestation of the continued division of Europe – should be a primary goal of EU
policy. These frontiers included, among others, border controls for the imposition of
value-added tax (VAT) on imports by one Member State from another Member State
and the collection of statistical information on imports and exports. The costs of these
controls to business were an impediment to intra-EU trade. Hence, they should be
eliminated.
After much discussion of various alternative VAT systems without border controls, the
Council agreed on Directive 91/680/EEC, which abolished these controls under the
deferred payment system. Henceforth, VAT on goods from other Member States would
not be collected by the customs office, but be payable by the first taxable person in the
importing Member State. The new system was called the transitional regime. The
regime would expire on 31 December 1996, but it could be extended on an annual basis
if agreement on the definitive system could not be reached. To date, the transitional
regime is still in place and it is unlikely that it will be changed in the foreseeable future.
Under the transitional regime, intra-EU business transactions are called intra-
Community (IC) transactions. Exports to other Member States are labelled IC supplies,
and imports from other Member States are labelled IC acquisitions. The only significant
difference with the pre-1992 customs procedures is that IC acquisitions must be
reported on the domestic VAT return rather than to the customs office. Moreover,
customs controls have been replaced by a VAT information exchange system (VIES).
Under this system, taxable persons have to report their taxable sales to taxable persons
in other Member States, including their VAT identification numbers, on a quarterly
basis (listing requirement). The same applies to IC acquisitions, although in The
Netherlands, for instance, the VAT return is used for this purpose. The exchange of
VIES data between the Member States should enable the VAT administrations in the
Member States to match the total of IC supplies (acquisitions) by each taxable person
with the total of IC acquisitions (supplies) by taxable persons in other Member States.
Furthermore, a statistical data collection system, referred to as the Intrastat system, was
set up to collect trade data between Member States (Council Directive 3330/91/EEC).
The statistical requirements pertain to IC transactions in goods (services are exempt),
irrespective of whether or not the goods are subject to commercial transactions.
Information on inter-company transactions, for instance, also has to be reported. Due to
the transitional VAT and Intrastat system, the legal and procedural requirements
imposed in respect of IC transactions differ from those imposed on domestic
transactions. These requirements bring additional (differential) compliance costs in their
train.
8This paper determines and analyses these differential compliance costs for Dutch
business firms with IC transactions, as well as their impact on intra-EU trade intensity.
We start by reviewing previous surveys that have attempted to measure the differential
compliance costs. We believe that these surveys exhibit various methodological
shortcomings. Subsequently, we describe our own survey and specify the estimated
multiple regression equation that captures the determinants and quantitative effects of
the differential compliance costs of IC transactions. We find that these costs are on
average 5 percent of the value of firms' IC trade. Substantial differences between firms
can largely be explained by economies of scale and information technology related
variables. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that the differential compliance costs
reduce the IC trade intensity of firms across industries and trades. In the concluding
section, we submit that the high burden of these costs constitutes a barrier to IC trade
and therefore violates the non-discrimination provisions of the EC Treaty.
2. Previous studies
A number of studies have estimated the costs to business of complying with various tax
and statistical requirements in respect of IC trade, both before and after the abolition of
border controls.
Costs of a 'non-unified' Europe
In the mid 1980s, the European Commission, as part of its Single market program,
commissioned a survey on the costs of a 'non-unified' Europe. In the course of the survey,
referred to as the Cecchini Report (1988), some 500 companies in six Member States
(Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) were
interviewed, to determine, among others, the compliance costs of tax, customs and trade
data reporting requirements in respect of IC trade. The sample results were extrapolated
on an EU-wide basis. The Cecchini Report estimated the aggregate costs to business of the
procedures at internal EU-borders in 1986 at euro 8 billion, or 2 percent of the value of total
IC trade.1 These costs represented the direct costs of companies, including the costs of
transit delays, but not the opportunity costs in terms of trade foregone. Government costs,
estimated at euro 0.5-1.0 billion, were low by comparison.
Three specific findings of the Cecchini Report are worth noting. Firstly, the costs of
customs procedures per consignment (on average euro 69 per import procedure and euro 85
per export procedure) were lowest in the Benelux countries, Belgium and The
                                                          
1 The value figures in the Cecchini Report are denominated in ECU. In this paper, all
monetary units have been converted into euro at the current exchange rate.
9Netherlands.2 This could be attributed to the simplified VAT procedures, including the
deferred-payment scheme, that these countries already used prior to 1992 – indeed, ever
since the introduction of their VATs in 1971 and 1969, respectively. In addition, the
customs and trade declaration forms for IC (and third-country) transactions were already
integrated. At the same time, Italy, for instance, had two separate organisations
administering both obligations at considerably higher costs. Secondly, the costs of customs
procedures per consignment incurred by small companies were on average 30 percent to 45
percent higher than the costs of large companies.3 And thirdly, company managers
estimated that the costs savings associated with the abolition of EU border controls
would be 5 percent of total sales (Cecchini et al, 1988, p. 48).
Evaluations of the transitional VAT and Intrastat system
Although the expectations of the business community regarding the Europe 1992 project
had been high, the new legal and procedural requirements of the transitional VAT and
Intrastat system were considered disappointing. This is the gist of the six surveys that
were undertaken prior to our study. Table 1 summarises various particulars of these
surveys that differ significantly in method and geographical scope.
                                                          
2 Cecchini et al (1988) provide the following breakdown of the costs of import/export
procedures (in euros) at internal EU borders in the six Member States covered by the
survey: Belgium (26/34), The Netherlands (46/50), Germany (42/79), United Kingdom
(75/49), France (92/87), and Italy (130/295).
3 Specifically, the costs of customs procedures per consignment were on average euro 85 for
imports and euro 95 for exports by companies with less than 250 employees and on
average euro 47 for imports and euro 75 for exports by companies with 250 employees or
more (Cecchini et al, 1988, p. 18 of the detailed version of the report).
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Table 1. Evaluations of VAT transitional regime and Intrastat system
Single market
surveys
Geographical
scope
Data collection
method
Sample Response
Ball (1993) All Member States
per 1 January 1993
Mail questionnaire 3,500
companies
600 (17.1%)
Netherlands Board
of Small Businesses
(RMK) (1994)
The Netherlands Mail questionnaire 1,500 small-
and medium-
sized
companies
190 (13%)
Knigge and Regter
(1994) for EIM
The Netherlands Telephone and
face-to-face
interviews
N/A Telephone calls 208;
Face-to-face interviews 17
Michie (1995) for
KPMG
United Kingdom Mail questionnaire N/A 3,000
Haase (1996) for
Handwerkinstitut
All Member States
per 1 January
1993, except
Greece
Mail
questionnaire
11,404
companies
1,210 (10.6%)
European
Commission
(1997)
All Member
States per 1
January 1993
Mail, telephone or
face-to-face
interviews as
preferred by
respondents
Non-random
selection
222 responses
covering
exports/despatches;
223 responses
covering imports/arrivals
The findings of the various surveys can be summarised as follows.
1. The European Commission (1997) reported that the introduction of the transitional
VAT and Intrastat system had reduced compliance costs by approximately two-thirds
overall.4 Nevertheless, only 49 percent of respondents preferred the new system to
the previous customs regime. Generally, other surveys were more sceptical about the
blessings of the new system. The European-wide survey of Haase (1996, p. 181)
showed that only 18.3 percent of respondents believed that the abolition of border
controls had reduced compliance costs. Moreover, approximately two-thirds of these
respondents (14%) considered the advantages as minor (Haase, 1996, p. 181). As
regards specific Member States, in The Netherlands, more than half of respondents
reported higher compliance costs as a result of the new system (RMK, 1994). In the
United Kingdom (Michie, 1995), only 19 percent of respondents believed that the
change-over was on balance advantageous, while more than 42 percent disagreed with
                                                          
4 Similarly, Ball (1993) found that 61 percent of respondents believed that the abolition of
border controls was, on balance, advantageous. Unfortunately, his survey does not specify
from which population and how companies were selected.
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the statement that the abolition of customs procedures compensated for the new
requirements of the VAT and Intrastat system.
2. The views on the merits and disadvantages of the new system varied considerably
among Member States (Ball, 1993; Haase, 1996; European Commission, 1997). While
companies in northern Member States were generally sceptical about the costs savings
under the transitional VAT and Intrastat system, companies in southern Member States
reported significant gains compared with the previous customs regime. As noted by
Cecchini et al (1988) and Ball (1993), this difference should be attributed to
differences between the old and the new system in the various Member States. Prior
to 1993, the costs of the old regime were considerably lower in northern Member
States. This implies, of course, that the costs savings should not necessarily be
attributed to the change-over per se.
3. Interestingly, large companies with established business information systems, needed
more time and incurred higher costs in adjusting to the transitional VAT and Intrastat
system than small companies (Ball, 1993; EIM, 1994; Michie, 1995).5 Furthermore,
companies with a small volume of IC trade benefited little and in some cases even
suffered from the new system (European Commission, 1997).
4. The VAT reimbursement procedure for companies acquiring goods in other Member
States without being registered in those States was perceived as ineffective. Ball
(1993) reported that only 69 percent of respondents actually reclaimed the tax. The
remaining 31 percent considered the procedure as cost ineffective. Haase (1996) found
that more than three-fourths of respondents reported difficulties with the
reimbursement of VAT paid in other Member States.
5. Companies involved in chain transactions viewed the new system as complex and
costly (Ball, 1993; Michie, 1995).6 In triangular transaction (i.e. chain transaction
confined to three registered persons in different Member States), the intermediate
trader (B) has to register in the Member State of the final purchaser (C) to whom the
first trader (A) delivers the goods. Hence, the sale from A to B is an IC acquisition
                                                          
5 RMK (1994) is an exception. It reported that the increase in compliance costs as a
percentage of total sales was higher for small than for large companies. But when we
recalculated the compliance costs by company size measured by the number of employees,
we found that the highest compliance costs were clearly incurred by companies with the
largest number of employees.
6 Chain transactions involve more than three sales of the same goods in different Member
States, while the goods are delivered by the first seller to the last buyer. Michie (1995)
reports that chain transactions comprise 30 percent of IC transactions in the United
Kingdom. The majority of companies involved in chain transactions were large and
medium-large companies. Only 4 percent of companies that engaged in triangular
transactions had total sales of euro 82,000 or less (Ball, 1993).
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of B in C's Member State, while the transaction between B and C is a domestic
transaction in C's Member State. Because B's registration in Member State C gives
rise to additional compliance costs for intermediate traders, a simplified procedure
has been agreed upon which relieves B from the registration requirement in C's
Member State. Ball (1993) reported, however, that this so-called simplified
procedure was used by only 52 percent of trade intermediaries.7 In the United
Kingdom, 44 percent of respondents believed that the simplified procedure was not
cost effective (Michie, 1995).
Methodological flaws
Various surveys have methodological shortcomings, such as a lack of transparency of the
sampling procedures (Ball, 1993; European Commission, 1997) and low responses (Ball,
1993; Knigge and Regter, 19948; Haase, 1996). In the two European-wide surveys
(Haase, 1996; European Commission, 1997) only a small number of companies were
interviewed in some Member States which made the surveys less representative than
desirable. In addition, some of the surveys could be biased, because questions were
addressed to accounting personnel who, at the time of the surveys, had limited experience
with VAT and Intrastat compliance procedures that were previously handled by logistical
staff. Perhaps the most serious shortcoming of most surveys is that compliance costs
were expressed as a percentage of total sales or accounting costs. Compliance costs of
IC transactions are incurred to support IC transactions of individual firms and therefore
should be related to the value of IC trade of these firms.
Finally, the theoretical underpinnings of most studies, particularly in terms of research
design, are weak. Generally, the studies attempt to realise two research objectives that
require conflicting research designs. One objective is to evaluate the European legal
systems as such, while the other objective is to identify differences in implementation of
legal systems between Member States. Large variations in the variables require the use of
different constants in the research designs. The first objective requires a large variation of
companies and as few as possible differences in implementation by Member States. By
contrast, the second objective requires a limited number of similar companies and as much
                                                          
7 Ball (1993) found that the majority of companies involved in chain transactions were large
en medium-large companies. Furthermore, only 4 percent of companies that engaged in
triangular transactions had total sales of euro 82,000 or less.
8 The sample of Knigge and Regter (1994) consisted of only 17 "average" companies. This
small sample was justified on the ground that compliance costs were estimated using the
"cash" approach which calculates costs in detail by measuring the required time of each
component of the compliance activity. This approach reduces the likelihood that
respondents omit compliance activities and consequently underestimate compliance costs.
But contrary to the "average company" assumption, Knigge and Regter  (1994, p. 34) found
that there were large differences in the way companies complied with the new
requirements.
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variation in implementation between Member States as possible. The combination of these
objectives in one research design results in findings that have limited value for either
objective, as shown by the European-wide studies of Haase (1996) and the European
Commission (1997).
3. Organisation of survey
Our survey attempts to evaluate the compliance costs of the transitional VAT and
Intrastat system for IC transactions and not to identify the consequences of differences in
implementation between Member States. Hence, our study requires a large variation of
firms and as few as possible differences in implementation. This can be achieved by
confining the sample to VAT entities in one Member State. We chose The Netherlands for
three reasons. Firstly, the country is a centre of European-wide distribution networks with
ample experience in IC transactions. Secondly, VAT-liable firms and tax offices in The
Netherlands had substantial experience with the deferred payment scheme prior to the
introduction of the equivalent transitional regime. Thus, the effect of adjustment problems
should have been minimal. Thirdly, the implementation of EU legislation and regulations
on VAT and Intrastat by the Dutch VAT administration is generally considered as
efficient. All three aspects imply that our estimates of IC compliance costs are likely to
be low when placed in an EU-wide context.
The survey form, which was drafted with the assistance of tax advisors, tax officials and
organisations of employers and accountants, consisted of three parts. Parts A and B
requested data on the general characteristics of the firm, its business information system,
and IC transactions. Part C requested information on compliance costs activities related
to IC transactions.9 These activities include (1) the search for and verification of VAT
numbers, (2) the retrieval from the business information system of (different) data on IC
transactions for the VAT return, the quarterly sales listing, as well as the Intrastat return,
and (3) the processing of the VAT return, the sales listing and the Intrastat return in the
business information system. The respondents were requested to indicate average time
and frequency per activity. Measurements of compliance activities were translated into
monetary values by multiplying them with the average labour costs of accounting
personnel, including a mark-up for overhead costs.
The sample was randomly selected from the data base of VAT registered firms in The
Netherlands. To select firms with IC transactions, the Dutch VAT declaration form was
used which requires firms to provide information on the volume of IC transactions. Of
2,988 active firms with IC transactions, 642 (21.5%) firms responded after one reminder.
The response was tested for representativeness with respect to the size and economic
activity of the responding firms. The evaluation did not indicate significant differences,
except that firms with more than 100 employees had a higher response rate than smaller
firms.
                                                          
9 The data were collected three years after the introduction of the Single market; hence, the
influence of adjustment costs, if any, should be minimal.
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4. Results
Our survey reveals that total differential compliance costs of IC transactions of VAT-
liable firms in The Netherlands are on average 5 percent of the value of their IC trade
with large variations around this average.10 Figure 1 shows the compliance costs of IC
trade against the number of IC transactions. At one extreme, there is a large number of
firms with a small volume of IC trade that are confronted with excessively high
compliance costs. By contrast, a relatively small number of firms with sophisticated
business information systems have very low compliance costs. Almost two-thirds of firms
with IC trade have less than 60 IC business transactions per annum. These small IC traders
have compliance costs that exceed the average of 5 percent of the value of IC trade per
firm. More than one-third of firms incur compliance costs in excess of 12 percent of
their IC trade. The differences in compliance costs between firms with and without IC
trade are attributable to the transitional VAT regime and the Intrastate requirements.
These compliance costs represent a hefty discriminatory border tax that should be a
significant impediment to internal EU trade.
Figure 1. Relative compliance costs of IC transactions and number of IC transactions
                                                          
10 To convey an impression of total VAT compliance costs of IC transactions, the 5 percent
should be added to the general VAT compliance costs. Unfortunately, with respect to The
Netherlands, only estimates of aggregate compliance costs as a percentage of aggregate
turnover of classes of firms are available. These estimates range from 2% of turnover for
small firms to 0.006 percent for very large firms (Allers, 1994, p. 129). Of course, these
figures have little relevance for our analysis.
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Determinants of compliance costs of IC transactions
To identify the determinants of compliance costs of IC trade, we estimated an exponential
function. The equation is non-linear in the variables but linear in the coefficients and thus
can be linearised by applying a logarithmic transformation. The logarithmic transformation
yields a function with a double-log functional form, which can be estimated by ordinary
least squares. The choice of this functional form is based on the assumption that
compliance costs elasticities are constant. This functional form is generally accepted in the
compliance costs literature (Blumenthal and Slemrod, 1994; Guntz et al, 1995).11 The
dependent variable of the equation is compliance costs of IC transactions expressed as a
percentage of the value of IC transactions. The independent variables and measures are
shown in the first column of Table 2.
The estimated results of the multiple regression analysis are also presented in Table 2. The
F-value of 54, shown at the bottom of the Table, is significantly above the critical F-value
of a 99 percent confidence interval. Thus, based on the F-value, the regression equation is
statistically significant. The adjusted coefficient of determination R2 suggests that, taking
into account the degrees of freedom of the regression equation, 72 percent of the variation
around the average of the dependent variable can be explained by the regression equation.
This is a reasonable score for cross-sectional research that includes a large variety of firms.
                                                          
11 We explored alternative functional forms but none were found to be satisfactory.
Furthermore, none of the correlations between the independent variables had a value higher
than 0.7. The method is insufficient, however, to detect multicollinearity in regression
equations with more than three explanatory variables. Hence, VIF-scores and matrix
decomposition were used to detect multicollinearity, but neither method indicated any
problem with the equation.
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Table 2. Results of multiple regression analysis of the determinants of
               compliance costs of IC transactions
Explanatory
Variables
Estimated
Coefficients
Standard
Errors
t-values Significance
(Constant) 4.8954 0.5261  9.305 P < 0.01
Firm size (number of employees in fte) (α1)  0.1241 0.0535   2.243 P < 0.05
Manufacturing* (α2) -0.0285 0.2461  -0.116 NS
Trade* (α3)  0.2131 0.2025   1.052 P < 0.01
Filing frequency (monthly/quarterly) (α4) -0.8747 0.1694  -5.164 P < 0.01
Frequency of IC transactions (α5) -0.7235 0.0467 -15.509 P < 0.01
Average transaction size (α6) -0.7867 0.0501 -15.701 P < 0.05
Threshold IC acquisitions* (α7) -0.4771 0.1962  -2.432 NS
Threshold IC supplies* (α8) -0.1805 0.2187  -0.825 P < 0.01
Number of new IC buyers (α9)  0.1451 0.0453   3.204 P < 0.01
Listing requirement* (α10)  0.6343 0.2353   2.696 P < 0.05
Computerised system* (α11) -0.4509 0.2043  -2.207 P < 0.05
Internal integration* (α12) -0.3465 0.1630  -2.125 P < 0.01
Government software* (α13)  0.5913 0.1653   3.576 P < 0.01
EDI with IC buyers* (α14)  1.1952 0.3766   3.174 P < 0.01
EDI with IC suppliers* (α15) -0.6446 0.3199  -2.015 P < 0.05
EDI with VAT office* (α16) -0.5818 0.3523  -1.652 P < 0.1
* dummy variable
Model summary Adj. R2 = 0.72 F = 54.37 N=350
The following comments can be made on the explanatory variables.
Firm size. The positive sign of the coefficient (α1) indicates that firm size has a positive
independent influence on relative compliance costs of IC transactions. More specifically, if
firm size increases by 1 percent, compliance costs as a percentage of IC trade increase by
0.12 percent. This result suggests that – despite the objective of the Single market program
to enable firms to exploit economies of scale – the artificial split-up of business
information systems of big European-wide companies involves diseconomies of scale.
Problems of business information systems can be reduced by advanced computer systems,
but a large volume of IC trade would be necessary to recover the costs. The current tax
requirements, moreover, were introduced as transitional arrangements. Consequently, the
write-off time of the costs would seem to be limited.
Type of business activity. The insignificant signs of the coefficients of the dummy
variables ‘manufacturing’ (α2) and ‘trade’ (α3) indicate that the type of business activity
does not have an independent influence on the compliance costs of IC transactions. This
finding is in line with the results reported by Allers (1994, p. 142). It suggests that
differences in compliance costs between economic activities are likely to reflect the
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influence of other variables, such as the extent of computerisation or the volume of IC
trade.
Filing frequency. The negative and significant sign of the coefficient of the dummy
variable (α4) indicates that firms with quarterly and annual filing frequencies have lower
compliance costs than firms with monthly filing frequencies. This finding is in line with
the results of a survey of the compliance costs of the Canadian VAT (Cléroux, 1992, p. 42).
Generally, the filing frequency of the VAT return depends on the amount of VAT that is
due. In this respect, small and medium-sized firms seem to have an advantage.
Number and average size of IC transactions. Everything else being equal, the estimates
suggest that if a firm increases the number (α5) and average size (α6) of IC transactions by
1 percent, relative compliance costs decline by 0.72 and 0.79 percent, respectively. This
supports the proposition of transaction-cost theory that the size and frequency of
transactions are the main determinants of transaction costs (Williamson, 1985). The result
is also in line with studies of VAT compliance costs (see, e.g. Sandford et al (1981)) which
report that compliance costs increase the smaller is the average size of the transaction.
Statistical thresholds.  The coefficient of the dummy variable 'threshold IC acquisitions'
(α7)  is negative. Contrary to our expectations, however, the coefficient of the dummy
variable 'threshold IC supplies' (α8) is not significantly different from zero, which suggests
a strong interaction between the compliance costs of the VAT listing and Intrastat
requirements. This finding indicates that the effectiveness of thresholds in reducing
compliance costs is limited by the interaction with other requirements.
Type of transaction. The positive signs of the coefficients of the dummy variable ‘new IC
buyers’ (α9 = number of requested VAT numbers) and the dummy variable ‘listing
requirement’ (α10) indicate higher compliance costs with respect to IC supplies
(compared with IC acquisitions). As expected, the requirement to request, verify and
process VAT identification numbers in the business information system is especially
onerous for companies that sell often to new IC buyers. The listing requirement increases
compliance costs of companies that are exempt from the Intrastat requirements for IC
supplies.
Computerisation, internal integration, and government-supplied software. The signs
of the estimated coefficients of the dummy variables ‘computerised system’ (α11) and
‘internal integration’ (α12) of inventory and accounting systems confirm the importance
of computerisation in reducing compliance costs. The sign of the coefficient of the dummy
variable ‘government-supplied software’ (α13) indicates that firms that use government-
supplied standard software are relatively inefficient.
EDI. Although it is often asserted that information and communication technology
reduces compliance costs, few studies have provided useful empirical evidence. In fact, the
positive and statistically significant value of the coefficient of the dummy variable ‘EDI
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with IC buyers’ (α14) appears to be at odds with the costs savings suggested in the
literature. One explanation of this unexpected result could be that the tax authorities accept
electronic invoices only if both buyer and supplier meet specified requirements in addition
to the normal requirements for conventional invoices. In addition, these additional
requirements may differ between Member States. Hence, these additional requirements
may increase compliance costs of IC transactions, particularly if more than one tax office
is involved. This finding is confirmed by a European-wide survey of the use of EDI for
invoicing purposes which indicates that additional VAT requirements for electronic
invoicing are complex and time-consuming (Schmidt, 1997, p. 261). It is also possible that
EDI is still in an experimental phase. In other words, the differential costs would decline
over time. The values of the coefficients of the dummy variables ‘EDI with IC suppliers’
(α15) and ‘EDI with tax office’ (α16) indicate that EDI can indeed reduce compliance
costs of IC transactions by respectively 47% and 44%.12
Effect of compliance costs on IC trade intensity
To estimate the effect of the differentially higher VAT and Intrastate compliance costs
on IC trade, we measured IC trade intensity as the total value of IC transactions as a
percentage of the total sales of firms. If compliance costs of IC transactions induce a
bias for domestic trade, IC trade intensity should decrease. We examine this relationship
using an exponential function where the log of IC trade intensity is the dependent
variable and the log of relative compliance costs of IC transactions is the independent
variable. The log of firm size and dummies for manufacturing and trade were included
to control for the influence of firm size and industry characteristics. (Dummies for
different types of goods were also included in the equation, but they proved to be
insignificant.) To make sure that the results were not driven by a restrictive
specification of the functional form, a flexible approach was adopted that uses first and
second order terms and interactions between the variables.
The results of the estimated regression equation are presented in Table 3. The F-value of
15 is significantly above the critical F-value of a 99 percent confidence interval,
indicating that the regression equation is statistically significant. To simplify the
interpretation of the estimated coefficients, the predictions of the equation are presented
in Figure 2. The curves in Figure 2 represent combinations of firm size and relative
compliance costs given a specified level of IC trade intensity. Consider, for instance, the
curve with an IC trade intensity of 0.20 in Figure 2. If relative compliance costs of a
given firm size increase, the firm will have to shift to a curve with a lower level of IC
trade intensity. This is true for any point on any IC trade intensity curve in Figure 2,
indicating that the level of relative compliance costs always has a negative effect on IC
trade intensity.
                                                          
12 These results were calculated using the following calculation rule for logarithms for
dummy variables (d):  ln(Ci|d=1) - ln(C|d=0) = ln {(C|d=1)/(C|d=0)}.
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Table 3. Results of multiple regression analysis
Explanatory
Variables
Estimated
Coefficients
Standard
Errors
t-values Significance
(Constant) -4.6663 0.7446 -6.267 P < 0.01
Log (firm size) (α1) -0.2681 0.1020 -2.628 P < 0.01
Manufacturing (α2)  0.7286 0.2402  3.034 P < 0.01
Trade (α3)  0.5255 0.2177  2.413 P < 0.05
Log (compliance costs) (α4) -1.0221 0.2180 -4.689 P < 0.01
Log2(compliance costs) (α5) -0.0616 0.0158 -3.893 P < 0.01
Interaction (firm size x costs) (α6) -0.0831 0.0194 -4.284 P < 0.01
Model summary Adjusted R2 = 0.32 F = 15 N=350
It should be noted that the coefficient of the interaction term13 in Table 3 is negative,
which indicates that the effect of relative compliance costs of IC transactions is smaller
if firm size increases. This can be seen in Figure 2 by the widening of the distances
between the curves if firm size increases. This means that larger changes of relative
compliance costs are needed in order to produce the same effect on IC trade intensity.
Thus, the effect of relative compliance costs decreases with increases in firm size.
Interestingly, Figure 2 indicates that even changes in very low levels of compliance
costs have a significant negative effect on IC trade intensity. This supports the
proposition of Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) that relatively small differences in
differential transaction costs can induce a significant bias for domestic trade. The
theoretical argument is that a bias for home trade depends on an interaction between the
differential costs of international trade and the elasticity of substitution between home
and foreign goods. Empirical estimates of the average size of this elasticity are rather
high (between 5 and 6) as well as biased downwards because information on goods that
are not traded is not included. The estimates of our study are biased downwards for the
same reason, since firms without IC trade are excluded from the sample.
                                                          
13 The variables in the interaction are mean-centered, a procedure commonly recommended to
reduce multicollinearity and provide to unbiased parameter estimates (Aiken and West,
1991). To check if this was successful, we employed two widely used measures of
multicollinearity (Judge et al, 1988). The maximum variance inflation factor as well as the
maximum condition index were well below the levels (10 and 30, respectively) that
commonly signal detrimental multicollinearity.
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Figure 2. The impact of compliance costs of IC transactions on IC trade intensity
5. Policy implications
In sum, our study shows that the differential compliance costs of the transitional VAT
and Intrastat system at on average 5 percent of the value of IC transactions represent a
sizeable border tax (with large differences between firms). These compliance costs
impede IC trade, distort competition and consequently weaken the competitive strength
of European businesses. Although our findings are specific to The Netherlands, it is
unlikely that the level of compliance costs would be lower in other Member States. We
doubt, moreover, whether current compliance costs are lower than the compliance costs
of the tax, customs and trade statistics regime prior to 1993. Our study also indicates
that even relatively low compliance costs can have a significant negative effect on IC
trade intensity if supply elasticities are high.
These findings should have implications for EU tax policy. The two important questions
that our survey raises are (1) do the new internal border taxes violate the 1957 Treaty on
the European  Community (ECT), as amended by the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam? and
(2) what can be done to bring the compliance costs down to a level that is acceptable
when judged in light of subsidiarity, neutrality, and feasibility considerations?
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Legal considerations
Directly applicable Community law prohibits overt and covert discrimination of IC
cross-border situations (supply of goods and services, cross border movement of
persons and capital), as compared to domestic situations. Prohibited is any different
treatment, without justification, by a single legislator (Member State or Community) of
similar situations on the basis of an arbitrary criterion, resulting in a disadvantage for
the cross-border as compared to the domestic situation (reverse discrimination). To
emphasise, it is constant case law that acts of Community institutions are also tested
against the constitutional principle contained in ECT. In principle, border taxes imposed
by individual Member States cannot be replaced by Community border taxes.
Furthermore, it is clear from case law in the income tax area14 that the distinction made
in international law between substance and procedure is not acceptable for the EU. The
starting point is that treatment of similar situations must be identical and that in order to
reach that result both the substantive and procedural tax rules must be the same so that
both the tax and the tax compliance burden, broadly interpreted, are the same.
Interesting for our survey is Futura (Case 250/95) in which the Luxembourg
requirement that non-residents, if they were to enjoy a carry-over of losses, had to
record those losses in accounts kept at the branch and in accordance with Luxembourg
rules, was considered EU incompatible. The Advocate General opined that the rule
constituted different procedural treatment by requiring non-residents to keep two sets of
account, one at head office and one at the branch, whereas residents only had to keep
one set of accounts. The ECJ considered that although the rule applied without
distinction to residents and non-residents, nevertheless it constituted a prohibited non-
discriminatory restriction to free movement.
The constitutional non-discrimination principle was tested in Case 114/96 in which the
appellant maintained that the Intrastat requirements violated Article 30 ECT (old) which
prohibits quantitative import restrictions and "any measures with equivalent effect" and
Article 34 ECT (old) which prohibits quantitative export restrictions and "any measures
with equivalent effect." The Advocate General opined and the ECJ concurred that trade
statistics are essential to obtain insight in the development and the completion of the
internal market. Accordingly, the ECJ was willing to accept the justification for legal
and procedural differentiation between domestic and IC situations, because this
different treatment was objectively justified, served an overriding public interest, and
did not result in an unnecessary burden on traders. The collection of these statistics
would be discriminatory only if the measure would exceed what is necessary to achieve
its purpose (proportionality principle).
                                                          
14 Reference is made to Biehl (Case 175/88), Commission vs. Luxembourg (Case 151/94),
and Schumacker (Case?)
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However, as we interpret the further developments in the internal market, it is not
excluded that the ECJ will reverse its position that differentiation in statistical (and
VAT) requirements between domestic and IC transactions, resulting in a disadvantage
for IC supplies and acquisitions, does not constitute unlawful discrimination. Before
1999, the collection of trade statistics was essential for the design of trade and exchange
rate policies of individual Member States. With the introduction of the euro, however,
this purpose has become redundant. In any case, the trade data collection requirements
are so fragmentary and incomplete that we doubt whether they serve much purpose at
all. Thus, services, a large and growing proportion of the national products of Member
States, are exempted from the Intrastat requirements. In the case of goods, moreover,
the requirement makes little sense in the case of intracompany transactions, representing
three-fourths of all intra-EU trade in goods, because the declared values are largely
meaningless. Finally, we note that federal countries, such as the United States and
Canada, do not collect trade statistics at internal state and provincial borders. Yet, this is
not considered an impediment to the formulation of the economic policies of individual
state and provincial governments.
Some suggestions
In attempting to formulate some suggestions to eliminate or at least mitigate the
differential compliance costs burden, we proceed from the assumption that Member
States should retain the maximum degree of autonomy in administering their own VAT
systems, including setting their own VAT rates. Accordingly, we do not consider
solutions which in essence would involve ceding the whole or part of the administration
of the various VATs to the European Commission. These proposals include the
Commission's (1996) common VAT, the "exporter rating system" (taxation of IC
supplies at the VAT rate of the country from which the goods are supplied in
conjunction with a tax clearing mechanism), and various "uniform rating systems"
(taxation of IC supplies at a uniform VAT rate, regardless of the rate that would be
applied to corresponding domestic supplies).15 Furthermore, we note that changes
involve new adjustment costs, particularly for firms with sophisticated business
information systems.16
Accordingly, we limit our suggestions to solutions that can be found within the
transitional VAT and Intrastat system. We offer the following ideas as food for thought.
                                                          
15 We refer to McLure's (1999) CVAT, Bird and Gendron's (1998) dual VAT, and Keen and
Smith's (1996) VIVAT. For a review of these proposals, as well as the Commission's
scheme, see Keen (2000) and Smith (2000).
16 We support the European Commission's call for reducing unwarranted differences
between Member States in VAT legislation, interpretation, and implementation. This
would lessen the complexity of the transitional regime and reduce the costs associated
with entry to other Member States (Smith, 1997, p. 22).
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1. Abolish the Intrastat system for VAT-liable persons with IC transactions on the
grounds outlined above. Intrastat requires data for each category of goods (identified
by the corresponding 8-digit code) on the Member Sate of supply and acquisition,
volume, value, nature of the transaction, supply conditions, and the probable mode
of transportation. The furnishing of these data represents a significant increase in
overall compliance costs. We note that the VAT and statistical requirements are not
suited to modern business practices of firms that try to use the economies of scale of
the Single market, but are obliged to record trade data per Member State.
2. Increase the assimilation threshold which exempts VAT-liable persons with IC
transactions from the requirement to file Intrastat returns. Instead the VAT return is
used for that purpose. An increase of the assimilation threshold to euro 1 million
would reduce compliance costs of IC transactions to less than on average 1% of the
value of IC transactions. More generally, we note that our study shows that
thresholds are an effective instrument to reduce business compliance costs, provided
that the threshold applies to all tax and statistical requirements.
3. Encourage individual Member States to perform joint audits of VAT returns. The
mutual assistance directive allows tax authorities to obtain any information which is
necessary for determining the tax which a taxpayer must pay. The bulk of IC
transactions takes place with neighbouring Member States. Following the example
of Euroland or Schengenland, regional groupings of Member States could agree to
monitor VAT obligations regarding IC transactions on a joint basis. By analogy,
bilateral and multilateral agreements already exist to investigate criminal activities.
4. Compensate firms with a small volume of IC trade for the compliance costs which
they incur. As shown above, the negative effect of compliance costs on IC trade
intensity is greater for small firms than for large firms. Compensation equal to 5% of
the first euro 1 million of IC transactions would reduce average compliance costs to
less than 0.5% of the value of IC transactions. This modification would not reduce the
quality of VAT information flows. Compensation could be given in the form of a
proportional tax credit against the VAT payable as shown on the return. Interestingly,
Denmark has a mechanism under its income tax to compensate small firms for the
disproportionate higher compliance costs which they incur (Sandford, 1995,
p. 255).17
                                                          
17 In Denmark, compensation is given at the rate of 2.5 percent of net income, with a
maximum of euro 790 which is reduced by euro 264 for every year of manpower working
capacity. Although a compensation scheme would improve the firm's competitive condition,
new distortions would arise if firms would be compensated differently among Member
States. In addition, the compensation would have to be an approximation of real costs and,
therefore, could easily be considered an export subsidy.
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5. Introduce licenses for IC traders that are links in complex IC supply chains. Firms with
accounting systems that meet specified requirements might be issued a license to trade
with firms in other Member States on a zero-rate basis. Generally, such firms have
sophisticated business information systems and therefore should be able to meet
additional requirements without much additional cost. However, firms with less
sophisticated business information systems would be disadvantaged by the conditions
attached to the licenses.
Obviously some combination of these measures should also be feasible. The measures
are not ideal in the sense that they would eliminate all compliance costs differences
between domestic and IC transactions. That ideal remains elusive as long as VATs are
administered at Member State level. As with other EU issues, a balance must be struck
between subsidiarity and neutrality considerations. But the EU is not on the right track
if the old tax, customs and statistical obligations which have the effect of border taxes
are replaced by EU-wide internal border taxes.
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